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Abstract 
 
This paper examines police misconduct in British Columbia focusing on municipal police 
officers who are subject to the BC Police Act. Police deviance and misconduct is explored 
through academic literature and several models are discussed that could provide a framework for 
police agencies to develop programs to reduce police deviance within their agency. The 
discipline process, as mandated by the Police Act, is explained so that these models may be 
integrated within the existing legislation. Substantiated misconduct summary data from 2011 to 
2017 was examined using a series of variables to determine if behavioural trends could be 
identified. The trends that were identified were reviewed in totality and specific to on and off-
duty conduct. Based on these trends, police agencies could isolate areas to focus future program 
development to prevent, reduce, and mitigate police deviance. The paper concludes with 
recommendations for future training program efforts and suggestions for further research. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Since the inception of Sir Robert Peel’s original policing principles for modern policing 
in metropolitan London in 1829, and the evolution of those principles drafted by later scholars, 
there have been codes of conduct set in place that police officers must follow to prevent deviance 
and misconduct contrary to their oaths of office (Lentz, 2007). The nature and scope of policing 
has changed since 1829 and policing has expanded to areas that were not traditionally labelled as 
police functions, such as motor vehicle regulation and enforcement, mental health apprehensions, 
youth protection and support, and partnering for homelessness solutions (Vancouver Police 
Board, 2017). Society has also changed in that traditional police methods and practices that were 
once tolerated are no longer considered acceptable or permissible under law and the Constitution, 
such as a writs of assistance formerly used by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) prior 
to 1982 to enter a dwelling house without warrant (Turk, 1982, p. 62). 
With the increase in multiculturalism, diversity, and the continued polarization of wealth 
in Western countries, such as Canada, the United States (US), and the United Kingdom (UK), 
police deviance and corruption continues to be an undesirable part of policing that is more 
prevalent in some countries than others (Kramp, 2014). In North America, the experiences with 
police deviance has varied as some Canadian and American police agencies have experienced 
little corruption, while others, such as the New York Police Department in the 1960s and 1970s, 
experienced extreme systemic corruption (Condon, 1982). This negative experience resulted in a 
complete overhaul of the New York Police Department’s internal investigations structure, 
process, and, as of 1982, resulted in 114 convictions for serious deviance ranging from bribes to 
overt violent crimes (Condon, 1982). 
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Police deviance and misconduct is present at both the individual and organizational level. 
To properly identify and define police deviance and misconduct, it must be considered on a 
spectrum, rather than as a dichotomy. Given that police deviance exists, once defined, the goal is 
to identify and remove those who are criminally deviant, while holding those committing 
misconducts accountable and rehabilitating them to be compliant police officers.  
In March 2010, the British Columbia (BC) Police Act underwent a significant 
amendment increasing civilian oversight by the Office of the Police Complaints Commission 
(OPCC) and reducing investigator discretion to close files by police professional standards (PSS) 
investigators (Police Act, 1996). Further, investigations were legislated to be completed within 
six months from admissibility, unless an extension was granted by the OPCC (Police Act, 1996). 
The Police Act governs both on and off-duty conduct for all municipal police officers, special 
municipal constables, and police officers forming part of an identified provincial police unit, 
excluding RCMP officers in BC, while the RCMP are governed by the RCMP Act in relation to 
conduct. Regardless, both are subject to the Criminal Code of Canada (Police Act, 1996; Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 2014). 
In addition, both BC municipal and BC-RCMP police officers are subject to civilian 
investigation by the Independent Investigations Office (IIO) whose mandate is to investigate all 
deaths and serious injuries to citizens caused by police officers both on and off-duty (Police Act, 
1996). However, all IIO investigations directed towards municipal police officers must include a 
coordinated and independent code of conduct investigation by PSS police officers of the 
respective police agency under the civilian oversight of the OPCC. The OPCC creates a public 
record on their website of all substantiated misconducts, including any public hearings or Section 
117 reviews. This record includes a summary for each file and the relevant misconduct 
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allegations. Therefore, the OPCC is the best available public data source on police misconduct 
because it captures all forms of complaints against municipal police officers, including any 
criminal charges or investigations pending with the IIO. The limitations of OPCC data is that 
they are generalized summaries and may not contain all cogent points of the event. 
A preliminary literature review specific to police misconduct and deviance (both code of 
conduct and criminal) revealed that most of the research has been conducted in the US and UK. 
The main issues that were revealed as contributing to both individual and institutional police 
misconduct were racism (Hong, 2017a; MacPherson, 1999), lack of police diversity (Hong, 
2017a; MacPherson, 1999; Smith, Johnson, & Roberts, 2015), little or no civilian oversight 
(Bies, 2017; Chanin, 2017), and limited direct community engagement (Bies, 2017; MacPherson, 
1999; Vito, Grossi, & Higgins, 2017). There was no specific research focused on BC municipal 
police officers with an interest towards categorizing substantiated misconduct types and an 
examination regarding the circumstances of those complaints to identify officer behaviours, 
trends, or themes that may have contributed to deviant behaviour. However, two reports, the first 
titled RCMP Code of Conduct Cases in British Columbia: A Five Year Review: 2005-2009 
(Plecas, Armstrong, & Cohen, 2011) and the second titled, An Analysis of Complaints Against 
the RCMP in British Columbia: A 15-Year Review: 1994-2008 (Plecas, Armstrong, Tassone, 
Cohen, & McCormick, 2010) provide a detailed review and analysis of RCMP officer 
misconduct behaviours for RCMP officers contracted as municipal and provincial police officers 
for BC. These studies form the foundation the research upon which this major paper hopes to 
build but differs in that the focus of this major paper is only directed towards municipal police 
officers employed by municipal police agencies and/or working within designated provincial 
police units. Research aimed at identifying both the quantity of off-duty misconduct relative to 
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on-duty misconduct, as well as the circumstances related to those events, would assist police 
agencies, civilian oversight bodies, and legislators in identifying potential institutional and 
individual behaviours, themes, or traits that may contribute to misconduct.  
This major paper will first define police deviance. Second, as part of a literature review, 
this major paper will present several models that may be used to address police deviance. Third, 
this major paper will outline the complaint process specific to BC municipal police officers as 
defined in the BC Police Act. Fourth, this major paper will discuss the results of a review of the 
OPCC summary data and will outline the methodology used to gather, collate, and review data 
from 2011 to 2017 derived from the OPCC misconduct summaries using 19 behaviour-based 
variables to identify trends and common behaviours that contribute to officer misconduct. 
Finally, this major paper will make a number of recommendations for BC municipal police 
agencies to assist police leaders to develop more effective strategies and programs to prevent and 
reduce police deviance. RCMP officers will be excluded from this major paper as they are a 
national police force, contracted as the BC provincial police force, and have different code of 
conduct legislation and offences that would not be directly comparable to municipal misconduct 
offences. However, the research for this major paper will build upon previous research 
conducted specific to RCMP misconduct (Plecas, Armstrong, & Cohen, 2011; Plecas, 
Armstrong, Tassone, Cohen, & McCormick, 2010).1  
Police deviance may exist to varying degrees in all police agencies. Through the 
implementation of both general and BC-specific strategies, police deviance and misconduct may 
be reduced with the goal of improving public trust in the police. To this end, this major paper has 
                                                        
1 For purposes of transparency, the author of this major paper is currently employed as a police inspector 
with the Vancouver Police Department (VPD). This major paper reflects the author’s research and views and in no 
way represents the position of the VPD. As well, all documents obtained and sourced within this major paper were 
from public sources. 
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two main objectives. First, to demonstrate that a review of the academic literature on police 
deviance can provide practical and applicable solutions for police and civilian oversight 
agencies. Second, that OPCC summaries of substantiated police misconduct events can be 
analysed to identify patterns or trends of similar officer behaviour that can serve as the basis for 
policy and program development and preventative measures.  
Defining General Police Deviance 
 
The academic literature specific to Canadian and BC police deviance and types of 
substantiated misconduct/corruption is limited. The Police Act (1996) defines police deviance as:  
Conduct that constitutes a public trust offence which is an offence under the Criminal Code or of 
any provincial enactment, a conviction in respect of which does or is likely to: 
 
1. Render an officer unfit to perform his or her duties as a police officer; or 
2. Discredit the reputation of the department with which the officer is employed. 
 
According to the Act, any conduct that is considered to be harassment, coercion or intimidation of 
anyone making a complaint, or hindering, delaying, obstructing or interfering with a Police Act 
investigation, is conduct that constitutes misconduct (Police Act, 1996). 
 
This definition is most applicable to BC municipal police officers as they are subject to the Act 
and, therefore, the definition. To try and gain a broader perspective of police deviance in BC, it 
is important to examine research that considers BC RCMP officers. Although RCMP are 
excluded from the data examined later in this major paper, their level of misconduct is a useful 
gauge as they police most of BC and this research helps one place the data discussed further in 
this major paper into context. From 2005 to 2009, based on data from the BC-RCMP, there were 
402 cases involving 601 substantiated allegations (Plecas, Armstrong, & Cohen, 2011). After 
excluding multiple counts of the same type of allegation in a single case and with multiple 
allegations included substantiated allegations totaled 947 (Plecas, Armstrong, & Cohen, 2011). 
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Some officers were involved in more than one case over this five-year period, therefore, the 
actual number of officers who had a substantiated complaint against them was 339 (Plecas, 
Armstrong, & Cohen, 2011). The average number of RCMP Code of Conduct cases completed 
in BC per year from 2005 to 2009 was 111 (Plecas, Armstrong, & Cohen, 2011). The proportion 
of substantiated complaints was relatively small and of the approximately 6,500 complaints 
made against officers per year (average 68) constituted less than 1% (Plecas, Armstrong, & 
Cohen, 2011). An examination of OPCC data from 2011 to 2017 revealed that, after accounting 
for multiple substantiated misconduct allegations for single events, there was a total to 274 
events resulting in substantiated misconduct against a municipal police officer (OPCC, 2011-
2017). After reviewing both the RCMP and OPCC data, the extent of BC police misconduct 
appears, for the most part, relatively minor in nature. Based on this data, criminal behaviour is 
rare and behaviour that appears more common in the US academic literature, such as bribes, 
evidence tampering, and targeted violence, is almost non-existent (Plecas, Armstrong, & Cohen, 
2011; OPCC, 2018). 
One conceptual framework for understanding police deviance is Knowledge Management 
(KM). KM is both a philosophy containing several conceptual approaches and a practice 
involving a distinct and complimentary process that provides a context and culture approach 
suggesting that the only thing that can really be ‘managed’ about knowledge is the context and 
culture in which it occurs (Dean, Bell, & Lauchs, 2010). It is described as: 
…the knowledge people possess in their heads and the various technological systems that can be 
used to explicate such tacit, experientially learnt knowledge. Thus, KM involves both a 
philosophy, consisting of different conceptual orientations or approaches, and a practice or 
technological base that revolves around a set of distinct yet complementary processes to do with 
knowledge creation, capture, storage, retrieval, transfer, sharing, application and integration 
(Dean, Bell, & Lauchs, 2010). 
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KM identifies police deviance as a continuum and uses a multidimensional scalogram 
analysis (MSA) to identify three different types of deviance: police misconduct (violations of 
departmental rules, policies, and procedures including noble cause misconduct); police 
corruption (misuse of police authority for gain, such as taking bribes); and predatory policing 
(police proactively engaging in predatory behaviour, such as extortion). MSA is a computerized 
method to analyse non-metric data and identify correlations (Dean, Bell, & Lauchs, 2010). It also 
recognizes that police deviance is not always one or two individuals but can include entire 
groups and organizations. Police organizations often react to police deviance and misconduct 
against individuals or “rotten apples”, but do not do a more in-depth examination to determine if 
there are “rotten barrels” (groups of officers) or “rotten orchards” (entire agencies) (Dean, Bell, 
& Lauchs, 2010). By utilizing the above typologies, analysing police deviance as a whole, rather 
than exclusively considering police misconduct or deviance as the actions of just a few corrupt 
individuals allows investigating bodies to ask the ‘right’ questions about the nature, extent, 
reach, and routinization of police deviance in an organization (Dean, Bell, & Lauchs, 2010). 
Therefore, for this major paper, police deviance and misconduct will be viewed as a sliding scale 
of “violations of agreed standards enshrined in various departmental rules and policies and 
norms of civil behaviour in society” (Dean, Bell, & Lauchs, 2010, p. 208) that includes police 
misconduct, police corruption, and predatory policing. 
According to Parnaby and Leyden (2011), the use of Merton’s Strain Theory (1938) can 
be useful for identifying police officers within an organization who may be vulnerable to 
possible police deviance. The authors describe several cultural and psychological impediments, 
such as a hyper-masculine environment, disdain for civilians, and officers feeling superior to the 
law, as potential contributors to officers engaging in police deviance (Parnaby & Leyden, 2011; 
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Parnaby, 2013). Despite these cultural and psychological factors, the majority of officers remain 
conformists and adhere to the rules. Moreover, police culture is specific to time and location 
(Cockcroft, 2017); however, there has been a general trend within the sociopolitical context that 
police culture is moving towards a more neo-liberal approach (Cockcroft, 2017). Neo-liberalism 
is described by Cockcroft as a “theory of political, economic practices that proposes that human 
well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade” (Cockcroft, 2017, p. 232). This culture has developed somewhat out of step with 
the greater sociopolitical context of governance, accountability, public order, and public 
engagement (Cockcroft, 2017). If left unchallenged, the police culture could have a negative 
effect on police legitimacy, effectiveness, and engagement with marginalized communities 
(Cockcroft, 2017).  
 
Using Merton’s theory, the authors describe four types of reactions to police culture that 
may lead officers to deviant behavior, excluding the conformist:  
 
i) The conformist is one who complies with the law and conducts him/herself 
professionally. 
 
ii) The innovator is one who will engage in unethical and sometimes malicious actions 
to fulfill lawful objectives (sometimes called noble cause corruption). An example of 
this might be an officer planting evidence to arrest a known offender; 
 
iii) The ritualist is one who works within the system but scales back the goals to get by. 
An example of this would be the police officer who is close to retirement and opts for 
a low-risk desk-job;  
 
iv) The retreatist is one who will not break the rules at work but will find interests 
outside work that might conflict with duties and/or may abuse intoxicants to escape 
the feeling of police organization repression. An example of this would be a police 
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officer engaging in substance abuse or suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), thus avoiding participating in police work; and  
 
v) The rebel who goes beyond noble cause corruption and utilizes ‘street justice’ by any 
means necessary to take revenge on criminals and takes the law into his/her own 
hands. An example would be an officer assaulting known offenders to take revenge 
because they feel the criminal justice response is inadequate or ineffective (Parnaby 
& Leyden, 2011). 
 
One may move from being a conformist into any of the other four categories for a short 
period of time or may dwell within a certain category for most of his/her career (Parnaby & 
Leyden, 2011). As a police officer’s behavior and the environment in which he/she works is fluid 
and dynamic so too are the categories of deviance (Parnaby & Leyden, 2011). One does not have 
to move through these categories in a linear fashion but may move within several categories 
during his/her career or not at all (Parnaby & Leyden, 2011). These categories of officers who 
might be more prone to engage in police deviance are germane because they provide a context to 
understand the root of the problems and the focus of strategies to reduce police deviance. These 
categories also serve as observable patterns of behaviour that supervisors and managers could be 
mindful of so appropriate prevention and intervention may occur when this behaviour is detected 
to prevent police deviance. Research that integrates the application of Merton’s theory to 
policing are discussed below.  
One of the earliest classifications by Roebuck and Barker (1974) of police deviance 
includes a number of behaviours, such as: 
i) corruption of authority;  
ii) kickbacks;  
iii) opportunistic theft;  
iv) ‘shakedowns’ (bribes);  
v) protection of illegal activity;  
vi) fixes (undermining criminal investigations); 
vii) direct criminal activities (police crime);  
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viii) internal payoffs; and 
ix) ‘flaking’ or ‘padding’ (planting, adding to or tampering with evidence). 
 
As one will note, these categories are more behaviour specific, but integrate well with Merton’s 
theory of police deviance, which will be further explored below. 
 Punch (2000) poses additional forms of police crime, like extreme violence, 
manipulating evidence, sexual harassment, racism, and police involvement in drug dealing 
(Punch, 2000). Klockars (1980) describes what some have referred to in police circles as the 
‘Dirty Harry Problem’, that is “the use of ‘dirty means’ to achieve ‘good ends’”. This is also 
considered a type of ‘noble cause corruption’. To better illustrate how the specific behavioural 
actions posed by Roebuck and Barker (1974), Punch (2000), and Klockars (1980) fit within the 
categories outlined by Parnaby and Leyden (2011) (see Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1 – Categories of Police Deviance 
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Literature Review 
 
Academic Findings for Police Deviance and Strategies for Improvement 
Civilian Oversight 
 
A key factor in preventing police deviance and the perception of police deviance is 
civilian oversight. In the US, in response to several police shootings, such as the 2014 shooting 
of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) through its 
Special Litigation Section (SPL) implemented independent civilian oversight bodies of police 
agencies with a specific mandate to review police use of excessive force, discriminatory 
policing, and unlawful stop and search protocols. Specific strategies and policies related to 
departmental organization structure, training, and officer accountability systems were 
implemented. In Ferguson, these changes were initially forced on the department, whose only 
recourse was to appeal in court. Given the cost of such an endeavour, Ferguson eventually 
conceded to the changes (Chanin, 2017). 
In other American jurisdictions, the SPL has learned that two impediments to change are 
police unions and the community; however, if properly consulted, these perceived foes can 
become allies (Chanin, 2017). Police unions often champion the rights of the officer and his/her 
personal privacy over the demands of the community (Bies, 2017). Police unions strategically 
frame arguments for oversight and public disclosure as endangering public safety and being 
contrary to public interest, thereby conflating “the public interest” with the private interests of 
police officers (Bies, 2017). The power imbalance of police unions over criminal justice policy 
makers provides unfair advantage to police officers and undermines public transparency and 
accountability (Bies 2017). This advantage often includes access to police officer personnel files 
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and disciplinary records for court purposes. Many police unions argue that disclosure of 
personnel files and police discipline records will negatively affect officer safety (Bies, 2017). 
Specifically, they argue that disclosure of police personnel records is a disclosure to a defendant, 
rather than a disclosure to the general public, as well as analogizing police officer privacy rights 
with other privacy rights (Bies, 2017). Al Gerhardstein, a Cincinnati-area civil rights attorney 
who was a key player in the 2002 Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement stemming from a lawsuit 
against the city, argued that having the police union and community representatives at the table 
creates a tone of collaboration and cooperation and increases the chances that rank and file police 
officers and community participants will accept the outcomes (Chanin, 2017). 
Contrary to the position of police unions, many in the public feel that access to discipline 
records supports accountability and transparency and promotes public confidence that the police 
can self-monitor leading to greater trust and mutual respect (Bies, 2017). Bies (2017) 
recommends four strategies for implementing civilian oversight and police transparency. The 
first strategy, referred to as ballot initiatives, are initiatives that would place decisions in the 
hands of voters and remove the political pressure felt by legislators when negotiating with police 
unions. The second strategy, known as post-conviction litigation, could be used to reveal gaps in 
criminal sentencing and offer judicial precedent to force police transparency through 
administrative and case law precedent. Third, participatory democracy is an important strategy 
that encourages rank and file police officers, police managers, and police unions to create and 
deliver transparency-based solutions to the community. The fourth and final strategy is 
supporting police membership in external identity-based organizations. Encouraging police 
officers to join community groups that represent their interests, such as Officers for Justice, a 
San Francisco law enforcement organization that promotes diversity in police departments, will 
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support diverse police perspectives that are rooted in the community and build trust and 
partnerships (Bies, 2017). These strategies are specific sub-strategies of civilian oversight and 
should not be confused with the overall strategies of preventing police deviance. Of the four sub-
strategies, participatory democracy and membership in external identity-based organizations 
would be most applicable to Canada due to Canada’s Westminster Parliamentary System and the 
administrative law practices applicable in BC police collective bargaining environments. These 
two initiatives could be implemented by both police agencies and police members themselves. 
Ballot initiatives and post-conviction litigation are more difficult to implement in Canada 
because many of the legal and political solutions suggested are based on an American Republic 
Democratic system rather than a Canadian Westminster Parliamentary – Constitutional 
Monarchy system. 
 
Diverse Recruiting 
 
A second overarching strategy to prevent and reduce police deviance is recruiting and 
retaining a diverse police department. Hong (2017a) undertook a detailed study and review using 
evidence from English and Welsh police forces that, in response to the United Kingdom’s The 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an inquiry by Sir William MacPherson of Cluny 
(MacPherson, 1999), and subsequent ten-year hiring targets commencing in 1999, measured the 
success of increasing diversity within 42 police departments. Hong’s (2017a) research revealed 
that there was an inverse relationship between the proportion of diverse officers in a police 
agency and the number of substantiated allegations made by citizens within the police force’s 
jurisdictional area. In other words, an increase in overall diversity reduced overall complaints. Of 
note, there was no evidence that hiring officers from a specific ethnic background reduced 
complaints from citizens of that shared ethnic background, with the exception of black citizens. 
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There was a measurable reduction of complaints from black citizens when a police force had a 
larger proportion of black officers. A second issue noted by Hong (2017a) was that complaints 
against newly hired diverse officers was much higher than against non-diverse officers. There are 
two possible explanations for this finding. First, many officers were hired under affirmative 
action programs and potentially had less qualifications than their peers, which could have 
resulted in less than desirable applicants becoming police officers. Second, many diverse officers 
were hired at one time and, like many new officers, they went through a period of learning and 
adjustment to their new roles as a police officer. Given this, the usual increase in community 
contact and complaints were exacerbated and these complaints and deviant behaviours should 
diminish over the natural course of an officer’s career (Hong, 2017a).  
Other explanations for the increase in complaints towards diverse officers point to 
internal causes. Investigators in the Professional Standards Branch (PSB) recounted that, in the 
early days of meeting diverse officer hiring targets, they were often pressured by commanding 
officers to try to be more lenient towards diverse officers because of political motivations. This 
led to allegations by Caucasian officers that they were being treated more harshly, so the PSB 
responded by no longer going easy on diverse officers. Interestingly, similar complaints were 
shared by diverse officers who felt that they were being treated more harshly than Caucasian 
officers because they were the subject of more complaints. In reaction to polarized claims of 
racism, members of the PSB strictly adhered to law and procedure when investigating complaints 
against diverse officers to prevent being perceived as racist. This resulted in more informal 
resolutions for Caucasian officers and more formal proceedings against diverse officers. This 
differential treatment led many diverse officers to believe that they were being treated more 
harshly than Caucasian officers and denied opportunities, such as transfers to specialty sections 
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and promotion to higher ranks. Interestingly, many Caucasian officers identified the police 
department as a “family”, while diverse members did not (Smith, Johnson, & Roberts, 2015).  
Hong’s second 2017 study focused specifically on police investigative traffic and 
pedestrian stops, again based on ten years of data from 42 English and Welsh police forces in 
response to the United Kingdom’s Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report and subsequent ten-year 
hiring targets commencing in 1999 (Hong, 2017b). Hong (2017b) noted that an increase of 
diverse police officers over a ten year period did not reduce the number of stops conducted 
against ethnic minorities. Hong (2017b) attributed this to the ability of police culture to 
supersede any potential community or ethnicity link felt among diverse officers. Often, diverse 
officers also have a higher level of education and are of a higher income and social class than the 
minorities living within the various communities in which officers frequently patrol (Hong, 
2017b). The result was that diverse police officers felt they had more in common with Caucasian 
officers (Hong, 2017b). 
However, Hong’s (2017b) study did show that with an increase number of black officers 
there was a decrease in searches and stops of black citizens. As well, active diverse officer 
representation in areas where racial profiling was historically high had the largest positive effect 
in reducing overall racial profiling in those communities. Therefore, diverse police recruiting is 
fundamental in creating a more equitable distribution of practice and eliminating institutional 
racism (Hong, 2017b). 
Although not without implementation difficulties and questions concerning fairness, as 
outlined by Hong (2017a), the overall conclusion was that, although there was no definitive 
evidence that diverse citizens preferred diverse officers, it was clear that the benefits associated 
with institutional representation improved attitudes and behaviours toward diversity in general, 
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rather than merely towards diverse officers. Moreover, this outcome can lead to an overall 
reduction in public complaints of police deviance. Therefore, the organizational integrity gained 
by diversity is paramount (Hong, 2017a). Programs that reach out to under-represented 
communities should be implemented by departments rather than lowering standards or creating a 
quota system as that can both undermine newly hired diverse officer credibility and expose the 
police agency to employing people who are not qualified or suitable for policing, which can 
contribute to retention issues, deviance, and corruption (Wilson, Wilson, Luthar, & Bridges, 
2017). 
 
 
Technology 
 
A third strategy to reduce the number of complaints against the police is through the 
increased use of technology. In efforts to thwart real or perceived racial profiling and increase 
transparency, accountability, and public trust, the use of body worn cameras by police officers 
while on duty is one option that has gained some public support (Wasserman, 2017). The 
implementation of body worn cameras by police officers was originally heralded by civil liberty 
organizations as the panacea to prevent police deviance and abuse. According to proponents, the 
video captured by the camera offers unbiased and objective evidence relating to the police-
citizen encounter, reduces citizen complaints, and acts as a deterrent for everyone, silently 
encouraging better behaviour from both police and citizens (Wasserman, 2017). Studies in Mesa, 
Arizona indicated that officers wearing cameras conducted fewer stop-and-frisks and made fewer 
arrests than non-camera wearing officers (Wasserman, 2017). Camera equipped officers wrote 
more tickets, were more likely to initiate self-generated citizen contacts on the street, and saw an 
overall reduction of public complaints by 48% (Wasserman, 2017). Officers in Rialto, California 
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revealed that officers wearing cameras were less likely to use force on suspects where no threat 
was first made against the officer compared to officers not wearing cameras (Wasserman, 2017). 
San Diego, California reported a significant decrease in substantiated complaints against officers. 
Further, no citizen complaints alleging severe misconduct were substantiated or found to be valid 
over a three year period (Wasserman, 2017).  
There were some criticisms of body worn cameras. Officers were often permitted to 
review the footage prior to responding to a complaint, as they would with their notes, and some 
civil liberty organizations argued that this allowed officers to construct a story around the 
footage. As well, video offers a fixed perspective of the incident, many times limited in scope, 
angle, view, and sometimes providing better clarity than the human eye (Wasserman, 2017). A 
common legal trap is that video trumps all other possible evidence as the “best” evidence, and 
this is not always accurate. Video is not neutral as the viewer constructs a subjective narrative 
and then views the actions in the footage through their personal lens (Wasserman, 2017). 
Personal ideology, race, gender, and other characteristics of the viewer will form part of a bias. 
Adding to the confusion, there may be other forms of evidence, such as witness testimony, 
secondary video sources, and physical evidence that conflict with the body worn video as 
different forms of evidence can provide different perspectives of the same incident. The most 
salient point is that any trier of fact must consider all evidence and weigh it accordingly, rather 
than relying solely on one piece of evidence, including body worn camera video footage 
(Wasserman, 2017). 
 
Policy and Community Engagement 
 
A fourth strategy is community engagement. Vito, Grossi, and Higgins (2017) argued 
that police departments must have a clear and explicit policy that racial profiling is not permitted. 
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It must contain a clear definition and explanation about racial profiling and provide practical 
examples for police officers. The policy must also communicate a clear message that racial 
profiling will not be tolerated. Police departments must also train officers about implicit bias, 
cultural differences, and ensure that objective criteria must be present to support lawful checks of 
citizens. Criteria such as time of day, location, common criminal activities in the neighbourhood, 
subject behaviours, known subject history, information from third party citizens, relative distance 
from recent crime, and subject description matching suspect description from recent crime are 
just some objective criteria that officers may utilize. 
Vito, Grossi, and Higgins (2017) also emphasized the importance of direct community 
engagement. The police must not only engage at formal events, but on a daily basis during 
routine patrols with the community. As explained by Bies (2017), encouraging police officers to 
join community groups that represent their interests, such as Officers for Justice, will encourage 
diverse police perspectives that are rooted in the community and build trust and partnerships. 
 
Liability Insurance 
 
A fifth and arguably more experimental, American-based strategy that might prevent 
police deviance is introducing private liability insurance for police agencies. Rappaport (2017) 
explained that most police agencies respond with policy and procedures to prevent police 
deviance due to legislation, case law, and community pressure. However, the private sector could 
be the catalyst for police misconduct and deviance prevention. Most American police agencies 
have group self-insurance between smaller agencies or larger reserve funds for cities. This is 
money set aside and accessed if police engage in behaviours that results in a civil suit or action. 
This is a reactive model meaning that there are no incentives for police agencies to mitigate and 
reduce civil liability, police misconduct, or deviant behaviour because, regardless of any 
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preventative measures, they have equal access to liability funding. Further, there are no 
deductibles or premiums for this insurance. 
Rappaport (2017) suggested that police agencies and municipalities should no longer 
have access to self-insurance (taxpayer source funds) but should hold private insurance. Private 
insurance will force police agencies to proactively change individual, group, and organizational 
deviant or reckless behaviours to ensure proper coverage and a reduction in insurance premiums. 
Specifically, six areas would benefit from private insurance: policy development; education and 
training; audits; accreditation; personnel; and omnibus and structural reforms.  
Insurers should demand that police improve policies and practices in adherence to law 
and the Constitution to avoid unnecessary payouts to citizens. High-risk activities, such as 
pursuits, use of force, responding to domestic violence, and mental health would all be areas 
where insurance companies could demand robust policy and police compliance. Insurers would 
be able to provide turnkey, industry tested policies tailored for agency needs, but consistent with 
other agencies and the law. This would save agencies time, money, and resources from having to 
research and create agency-specific policy themselves. This might also ensure that education and 
training would be a priority. Insurers would have access to national and international trainers and 
programs to keep police agencies at the forefront of acceptable police tactics and law. This 
training would benefit officers and the communities they serve, while also being a pre-requisite 
for both insurance and premium reductions. Audits would ensure continued compliance and 
efficiencies for police practices. Having a large third-party insurer with access to those who 
specialize in professional audits would greatly assist police agencies who are not normally 
trained or experienced in such endeavours. This would demonstrate accountability to the 
community and form a part of fiduciary transparency. Accreditation would ensure that all insured 
 20 
police agencies meet industry standards and would prevent agencies from falling behind in 
training, tactics, and legal knowledge. It would also be another condition of insurance to reduce 
annual premiums. To reduce “bad apples” within agencies, mechanisms, such as early warning 
systems, could be implemented to monitor personnel. By using a variety of variables, such as use 
of force, motor vehicle incidents, complaints, sick time, and overtime (to name a few) for each 
member in comparison with industry and agency average officer thresholds, these early warning 
systems could identify officers who may be at risk or currently practicing deviant behaviour. 
Those officers who consistently score high and do not take steps to improve behaviour could be 
terminated. Instead of viewing police deviance as a dichotomy (good cop versus bad cop), one 
should approach it as a spectrum and understand the onset, desistance, duration frequency, and 
participation in deviance to differentiate between the officer who makes a mistake or a bad 
decision from the officer who is a chronic deviant police officer (Harris, 2016). Finally, omnibus 
and structural reforms are last resort measures for the insurer to demand organizational 
compliance in areas, such as structure, procedure, and personnel, or else the insurer would 
terminate coverage leaving the police agency exposed to civil liability and risk without insurance 
protection (Rappaport, 2017). 
One caution put forward by Rappaport (2017) is an equilibrium between the insurer and 
the insuree. A key factor in ensuring this balance is maintained is the deductible. The deductible 
must be large enough that the police agency will consider the sum of the deductible a deterrent to 
frivolously using insurance. Instead, the insuree will implement risk management strategies to 
prevent insurance use and maintain low premiums. Conversely, the deductible must not be so 
large as to relieve the insurer of its involvement. The deductible must be low enough that, if paid 
by the insuree, it still means the insurer has considerable financial interest in the coverage. That 
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is, the insurer must have “skin in the game” (Rappaport, 2017, p.1591) and a vested interest in 
helping agencies make positive organizational, policy, and personnel changes to reduce the 
likelihood of police deviance resulting in insurance use, thereby preventing costly underwriting 
on its part. 
Overregulation by the insurer is also a potential cause for concern because it could result 
in the insurer being so risk adverse that they do not allow police to engage in their core 
functions. Police work is by its nature risky and the clients police officers interact with are often 
violent and unwilling to obey the law and civil norms. However, if there was sufficient private 
insurance competition within the market, this would mitigate this concern because police 
agencies that were overregulated would merely switch to a more risk tolerant insurance 
company. As well, because police agencies must maintain high legal standards to qualify for 
premium insurance coverage, this qualification standard may lead to enhanced legitimacy of 
police in general and foster better cooperation and voluntary compliance with the law by citizens 
and criminals alike (Rappaport, 2017). As indicated by Chandrasekher (2017), the private 
insurance theory has yet to be empirically tested for validation, but further studies in this area 
might glean a better understanding of such a strategy. 
Investigative Structure in British Columbia for Police Deviance 
What is the Police Act and to whom does it apply? 
The BC Police Act is the legislation that governs municipal police officers and provincial 
designated police units specific to their code of conduct. It also provides all legislation 
concerning the structure and scope of police boards, the OPCC, the authority of the IIO, and 
various powers and authorities of those bodies and police officers appointed as investigating 
officers for Police Act investigations (Police Act, 1996). The Police Act applies to all police 
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officers, special municipal constables, and special provincial constables; however, it does not 
apply to the RCMP, even if they are part of an integrated provincial unit. The RCMP are 
governed by their own code of conduct legislation and fall outside the scope of this major paper 
(Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 2014).  
The Police Act is used to investigate municipal police actions whenever there is a citizen 
complaint, the OPCC deems it necessary to order an investigation, or when a police agency 
requests that the OPCC order an investigation (Police Act, 1996). It is important to note that this 
is not a criminal investigation. Police officers who are alleged to have committed a criminal 
offence, whether on or off duty, will be investigated by the police of jurisdiction and have the 
same rights as any other Canadian resident. However, in most cases, there will be a coordinate 
and independent Police Act investigation that is usually suspended until the conclusion of the 
criminal investigation and the outcome of the decision (guilty or not guilty). One exception to 
this is if a police officer causes the death or grievous bodily harm to a citizen, whether on or off-
duty. In this case, it is more common for the case to be investigated by the IIO as a criminal 
investigation because this is both mandated in the Police Act and forms part of the IIO mandate 
(Police Act, 1996; IIO, 2018). The IIO is a civilian investigative body that investigates police 
officers in these circumstances. At the conclusion of the investigation, the IIO will share their 
report and recommendations with Crown Counsel who determines if there are sufficient 
reasonable grounds to lay a criminal charge (IIO, 2018). The purpose of suspending an 
independent Police Act investigation until the criminal investigation is complete is to prevent a 
police officer from incriminating him/herself. This can occur because municipal police officers 
are bound to cooperate with any Police Act investigation and provide a statement; however, this 
statement may not be used for any criminal proceedings as it is the result of an order and not a 
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voluntary statement (Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 7 & 11c). Moreover, it is important to note that 
police officers commit misconducts not offences under the Police Act, and Section 7 of The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) and the right to silence upheld in R v 
Hebert [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 do not apply. Further, the powers of search and seizure found in 
Sections 100 and 103 of the Police Act and any evidence gleaned from such a search are not 
admissible in a criminal proceeding as they were not obtained based on reasonable grounds to 
believe that a criminal offence had been committed as guaranteed by the Charter and criminal 
law. 
  
Police Act Misconducts 
Located within the Police Act are the specific misconducts that an officer can commit. 
These are located in Sections 77, 86, and 106 and range from abuse of authority to damage to 
police or public property without lawful excuse to corrupt practice (see Appendix A “Police Act 
Misconducts” for all misconducts in detail). Some of the titles are misleading and counter to 
what one would believe they would mean, which is why it is important to examine the legal 
description of the misconduct and not merely rely on the title. For example, corrupt practice 
includes not returning money without a lawful excuse and also includes using police equipment 
outside standard police duties. Another example is improper off-duty conduct which might lead 
one to believe that it is any inappropriate behaviour conducted by a police officer while off-duty. 
In fact, it is any time a municipal police officer holds him/herself out to be an RCMP officer. 
These few examples serve as a good reason for why merely reviewing the number of complaints 
in each category published on the OPCC website can be misleading. Further, the title of the 
misconduct does not provide any behavioural details about the officer’s conduct. Given this, it is 
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important to examine the circumstances of each substantiated misconduct using key behavioural 
variables to identify behavioural trends, rather than simply calculating misconduct types. 
 
Investigative Process and Options – Divisions 3-4, 5, & 6 
Division 3 
 
Most complaints against a municipal police officer are made by citizens because of a 
police officer’s behaviour or conduct (OPCC 2011-2018). These complaints fall under Division 
3 of the Police Act. There is a complex statutorily regulated format for how these complaints are 
to proceed (Police Act, 1996). Included in Division 3 are any ordered complaints made by the 
police agency or the OPCC. Examples of an ordered investigation would be in situations where 
either the police agency or OPCC becomes aware of an event and, despite no complaint from a 
citizen, deems it necessary to investigate the actions of the officer. Less serious complaints may 
be recommended by the OPCC to proceed under Division 4, which is an informal complaint 
resolution process in which, even if substantiated against the officer, the outcome of the 
complaint does not appear on the officer’s service record of discipline. However, if the 
misconduct allegation is serious in nature or the complainant and/or officer do not agree to a 
Division 4 informal resolution, the formal investigative process outlined in Division 3 will 
proceed. 
As presented in Figure 2, the Division 3 Decision Model illustrates the Division 3 Police 
Act process. As one will note, there are various avenues to make a complaint and several appeal 
mechanisms for both the complainant and the officer. 
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Figure 2: The Division 3 Decision Model 
 
(OPCC, 2018) 
 
While Figure 2 provides a detailed outline of the Division 3 complaint process, Figure 3 offers a 
more general overview of the complaint process. 
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Figure 3: Simplified Division 3 Complaint Process 
 
(OPCC, 2018) 
 
In effect, a complainant makes a complaint against a police officer, the complaint is 
reviewed by the OPCC to determine which misconducts might apply, the police agency PSS 
officer in charge is notified, and an officer is appointed as an investigating officer. The officer 
conducts an investigation that is to be completed within six months and shares all evidence, 
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statements, and updates with the OPCC contemporaneously ensuring civilian oversight. At the 
conclusion of the investigation, the investigator writes a Final Investigation Report (FIR) and 
submits it to the Discipline Authority (DA). In keeping with the police para-military structure, 
the DA holds the rank of inspector or higher, as these are commissioned officer ranks. The DA, 
who has been delegated the authority of a Chief Constable by the Chief Constable, reviews all of 
the evidence and writes a final decision as to whether the officer’s misconduct is substantiated. If 
substantiated, the officer attends a discipline hearing and is given his/her discipline as prescribed 
by the Police Act. The OPCC is informed of both the decision and discipline and may either 
concur or initiate various appeal mechanisms. The officer and complainant also have appeal 
mechanisms to appeal the decision (OPCC, 2018) & (Police Act, 1996). 
 
 Investigative Process – Division 6 
 
Division 6 investigations are internal investigations for an issue/complaint that involves a 
sworn employee of the police agency and when the event does not affect the public. BC 
municipal police officers are union employees and have various collective agreements. This is 
the forum most similar to other employer/employee investigations found in other union 
environments, but with the added oversight of the Police Act. Examples of these types of 
investigations could be an officer disobeying a direct order that did not affect public safety or 
bullying and/or harassment contrary to WorkSafe-BC legislation, the BC Human Rights Code, or 
specific police agency respectful workplace policy. The OPCC is still advised of all such 
complaints and apprised of the outcome and any discipline that may have occurred from the 
internal investigation. If the OPCC is dissatisfied with the investigation or outcome, they may 
order a Division 3 investigation. All substantiated Division 6 complaints appear on the officer’s 
service record of discipline (Police Act, RSBC 1996). 
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As the largest municipal police agency in BC, the VPD was examined to determine their 
internal discipline process. The VPD Human Resources (HR) section conducts the majority of 
Division 6 investigations, albeit some are conducted by PSS, although PSS primarily focuses on 
Division 3 and 4 investigations (Vancouver Police Department, 2013). An examination of the 
current VPD Respectful Workplace policy located in section 4.1.11 of their Regulations and 
Procedures Manual (RPM) makes reference to the Police Act as the overarching legislation 
(Vancouver Police Department, 2013). It does discuss diversity and all forms of prohibited 
conduct as outlined in the BC Human Rights Code (Vancouver Police Department, 2013). It also 
provides a complainant with both a formal and informal investigation model. 
Figure 4 illustrates the internal discipline process taking into consideration all of the 
requirements of the Police Act and other statutes, such as the BC Workers Compensation Act, BC 
Human Rights Code, and the BC Occupational Health and Safety Regulation. 
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Figure 4: Division 6 Vancouver Police Decision Model2 
 
 
(Vancouver Police Department, 2013) 
 
As illustrated above in Figure 4 when a complaint is brought to the attention of HR, they 
conduct a basic fact finding assessment to clarify the information and identify the 
complainant(s), witnesses, and subject employee(s).3 HR notifies the police executive leadership 
of the complaint and reaches a decision to determine if the complaint is criminal or within the 
Police Act. If criminal, the case is given to the Major Crime Section (MCS) for investigation, or 
the IIO if within its mandate, while the Vancouver Police Union (VPU), PSS, and OPCC would 
                                                        
2 The dotted lines indicate that discussion may occur at this stage, but it will be case specific. Solid lines 
indicate a mandatory line of communication.  
3 Regardless of its formal role, HR will support the complainant, witnesses, and subject employees to ensure 
employee wellness. This is accomplished by the support unit within HR being separate from the investigatory unit. 
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be updated as appropriate. Once the criminal process is complete, the Police Act process 
resumes. If not criminal, or once the criminal process is completed, the first filter would be PSS 
who would consult with the OPCC about the circumstances of the complaint and determine if it 
should be investigated under Division 3 or Division 6 of the Police Act. Once decided, the VPU 
engages in keeping with their Collective Agreement. If the complaint is deemed Division 3, it is 
investigated by PSS; however, if Division 6, the complaint is returned to HR. At this point, HR 
will then determine if it is a standard labour complaint or bullying/harassment, as outlined in the 
VPD Respectful Workplace policy. Furthermore, if it falls under the Respectful Workplace 
policy, HR will adhere to the formal or informal process prescribed by the policy. Throughout all 
Division 3 and Division 6 processes, the OPCC remains the civilian oversight body and reviews 
the final decision and any discipline that occurs.  
 
Division 5 
 
This major paper will make brief mention of the Division 5 process, which are service 
and policy complaints directed to the Police Board (civilian employer) of the police agency. 
These are not directed at specific officer misconduct, but a larger issue that either the public or 
OPCC feels that the Police Board should examine further and possibly address. A recent 
example of this was the VPD research and publication of results concerning the validity of street 
checks (Gill, 2018). The specific results of this research are discussed further in this major paper 
to illustrate specific forms of potential police deviance, but the Division 5 process will not be 
discussed further within this major paper as Division 5 complaints do not pertain to the conduct 
of an officer, rather, the rules or policies in use by a police agency. 
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Ranges of Discipline within the Police Act and Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
Section 126(1) of the Police Act outlines the discipline available to the DA once the DA 
finds that the subject officer has committed a misconduct and has substantiated that misconduct 
based on the available evidence to a civil standard of proof. The level of discipline is subject to 
the specific circumstances of the misconduct and previous administrative case law available to 
the DA. The options available to the DA are listed below from the most serious to least serious: 
a) Dismissal; 
b) Reduction in rank; 
c) Suspension without pay for not more than 30 scheduled working days; 
d) Transfer or reassignment within the municipal police department; 
e) Require the officer to work under close supervision; 
f) Require the officer to undertake specified training or retraining; 
g) Require the officer to undertake specified counselling or treatment; 
h) Require the officer to participate in a specified program or activity; 
i) Reprimand the officer in writing; 
j) Reprimand the officer verbally; 
k) Give the officer advice as to her or his conduct. 
 
As part of administering discipline and corrective measures, the DA must consider, 
without limitation, the following aggravating and mitigating factors as per Section 126(2) of the 
Police Act: 
i. The seriousness of the misconduct; 
ii. The officer's record of employment as a member, including, without limitation, her or his service 
record of discipline, if any, and any other current record concerning past misconduct; 
iii. The impact of proposed disciplinary or corrective measures on the officer and on her or his family 
and career; 
iv. The likelihood of future misconduct by the officer; 
v. Whether the officer accepts responsibility for the misconduct and is willing to take steps to 
prevent its recurrence; 
vi. The degree to which the municipal police department's policies, standing orders or internal 
procedures, or the actions of the member's supervisor, contributed to the misconduct; 
vii. The range of disciplinary or corrective measures taken in similar circumstances; and 
viii. Other aggravating or mitigating factors. 
 
Section 126(3) of the Police Act is clear that discipline and corrective measure are meant to be 
restorative not punitive. “If the discipline authority considers that one or more disciplinary or 
corrective measures are necessary, an approach that seeks to correct and educate the member 
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concerned takes precedence, unless it is unworkable or would bring the administration of police 
discipline into disrepute” (Police Act, RSBC 1996, Section 126(3), p. 116). This is an important 
concept to understand when reviewing substantiated misconduct against BC municipal police 
officers because unless the misconduct is so grievous that it would bring the police 
administration of justice into disrepute, the purpose of the Police Act is not to punish, but to 
rehabilitate and ensure that officers return to performing their duties lawfully.   
 
Discipline Process 
The discipline process as mandated by Police Act is complex. As previously 
demonstrated in Figure 3, once the investigation is completed by the PSS sergeant and submitted 
to the OPCC, complainant, and subject officer within six months of the initiation of the 
investigation, the OPCC must first review the FIR and may reject it or request further 
investigation (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). If the OPCC accepts the FIR, the DA has ten 
business days to review all of the evidence and render a decision (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 
2018). During this ten day period, the subject officer may request additional investigation (Police 
Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). Barring any additional investigative steps requested by the subject 
officer, the DA will write a decision based on the facts and evidence of the case, with particular 
analysis on case law, statutory law, policy, and labour/administrative principles (Police Act, 
1996; OPCC, 2018). The standard of proof for these decisions is a civil balance of probabilities 
(Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). If during the DA’s review of the file, the DA believes that 
further investigation should occur, the DA may order the PSS sergeant to conduct further 
investigative steps and then have the sergeant re-submit the FIR (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 
2018). On the tenth business day, the DA will upload the decision to the OPCC, subject officer, 
and complainant (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). If the DA has unsubstantiated the allegation, 
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the complainant has ten business days to write the OPCC and request that the FIR and all related 
evidence be reviewed by a retired judge who would now act as the DA, called a section 117 
Police Act review. Of note, the OPCC must agree to this request (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 
2018). If the complainant does not request such a review, the OPCC has 30 business days to 
review the DA decision and either concur with it or forward it to a retired judge for a section 117 
Police Act review. Given this, the FIR and all evidence is reviewed by the retired judge and the 
judge may render a decision as the new DA (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). At the end of that 
decision, if the allegation is unsubstantiated and the OPCC agrees, the decision is final (Police 
Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). If either the OPCC disagrees or if the allegation is substantiated, the 
process moves into either a pre-hearing conference or a discipline proceeding (Police Act, 1996; 
OPCC, 2018).   
If the police DA or section 117 review DA substantiated the misconduct, the DA can 
either offer a pre-hearing conference to the subject officer or move directly to a discipline 
proceeding (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). A DA would only offer a pre-hearing conference if 
the subject officer admits to the misconduct, shows genuine remorse, and agrees with the 
discipline imposed (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). Any time that a reduction in rank or 
dismissal are being considered by the DA, no pre-hearing conference will be offered, and the 
case will move directly to a discipline proceeding (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). If the OPCC 
agrees with the discipline at a pre-hearing conference, the DA decision is final. If the OPCC does 
not agree with the discipline, the case moves to a discipline proceeding (Police Act, 1996; 
OPCC, 2018). 
A discipline proceeding is based on administrative law procedures and must occur within 
40 business days of the original police FIR submission or section 117 Police Act review decision 
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(Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). A DA may allow witness testimony or merely allow the subject 
officer’s representative to question the PSS sergeant as to the evidence collected during the 
investigation and the legal analysis within the FIR (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). In most 
agencies, a discipline proceeding is chaired by a senior commissioned officer of a rank of 
superintendent or above (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). Once the discipline proceeding is 
concluded, the police DA either renders a decision and discipline or provides a finding that the 
misconduct is unsubstantiated (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). The OPCC reviews the 
proceeding and discipline and if they concur with both, the decision is final. If the OPCC, subject 
officer, and/or complainant are not satisfied with the result of a discipline hearing, they may 
apply to the OPCC for either a review on the record or public hearing (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 
2018). A review on the record involves a retired judge reviewing all the facts and evidence, 
including the evidence gleaned at the discipline proceeding, and rendering a final decision. A 
public hearing, which is open to the public and similar to a civil trial, is a venue where the 
subject officer, complainant, and witnesses may be cross-examined and a retired judge presiding 
over the hearing will make a final decision (Police Act, 1996; OPCC, 2018). 
This is a lengthy process and one that is very legalistic. Given this process, it is very 
likely that complainants and subject officers may be dissatisfied with this process because from 
the time of the complaint to the time of resolution, especially if several appeal mechanisms are 
engaged, a complaint may take one to two years to resolve. Although Division 4 of the Police 
Act provides an avenue for informal resolution, complainants may prefer a formal investigation 
to seek some form of justice without understanding that because the Police Act is rehabilitative 
and not punitive, very rarely are officers terminated from employment, except in the most 
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grievous circumstances. A move to a more progressive statute focusing more on mediation and 
conflict resolution may serve both the community and police officers better. 
Methodology 
 
Analysis of 2011-2017 Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner Data 
 
Gathering and Coding Information 
 
The OPCC publishes annual and quarterly reports on their website for public review. This 
includes summaries of each substantiated misconduct complaint, agency file numbers, and 
specific categories of misconduct. As stated above, simply reviewing the misconduct types and 
calculating how many of each category occur each year is misleading as the categories often do 
not reflect the substance of the misconduct, nor do they represent specific officer behaviour. For 
this major paper, summaries from 2011 to 2017 were used as the Police Act legislation was 
amended in 2010 and several of the misconduct types and definitions changed. As these 
summaries may not have captured every detail of the complaint, the information gleaned from 
these summaries is used to reveal general information and trends, rather than specifics that would 
require further primary research beyond the scope of this major paper. 
To determine officer behaviours, when reading each summary, 19 distinct variables were 
coded. The variable definitions were created to be congruent with the misconduct types while 
focusing on behaviour typologies that may have contributed to the misconduct. The creation of 
these variables was based on common behaviours and actions noted in the research literature and 
after an overall review of the OPCC summaries. Below are listed the 19 variables and their 
associated definitions. 
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Variables 
1. Alcohol (V1) – Officer under the influence of alcohol 
2. Prescription Drug (V2) – Officer under the influence of a prescription drug 
3. Non-prescription Drug (V3) – Officer under the influence of a non-prescription 
drug 
4. On-duty (V4) – Misconduct occurred while the officer was on-duty 
5. Off-duty (V5) – Misconduct occurred while the officer was off-duty 
6. Secondary Employment (V6) – Officer’s secondary employment conflicted with 
duties and oath of police officer 
7. Deceit (V7) – Officer lied verbally and/or in writing during the course of his/her 
duties 
8. Training (V8) – A misconduct resulting from an honest mistake due to lack of 
training resulting in breaches of the law and/or departmental policy 
9. Lack of Appropriate Supervision (V9) – A supervisor/manager being aware of 
behaviour and not properly addressing and/or ignoring through willful blindness 
10. Inappropriate Use of Force (V10) – Using excessive and/or inappropriate force 
against a citizen whether on or off duty in police role 
11. Division 6 - Internal Discipline (V11) – Behaviour contrary to Departmental 
Respectful Workplace policies (bullying/harassment) or labour law 
12. Misuse of Police Databases (V12) – Accessing police data bases for a non-bona fide 
police purpose 
13. Inappropriate Sharing of Information (V13) – Sharing information gleaned from a 
police data base or investigation regardless of whether the initial access was a bona 
fide action as part of an officer's duties 
14. Non-Criminal Vice and/or Statutory Offences (V14) – Behaviour outside of 
police/community standards, such as soliciting sex trade workers in a private place, 
and/or a breach of a statute, such as the Motor Vehicle Act 
15. Failure/Lack of Appropriate Investigation and/or Reporting (V15) – Intentionally 
not investigating/reporting/documenting an incident to proper legal and departmental 
standards and/or conducting a negligent investigation 
16. Use of Police Position for Personal Financial Gain (V16) – Knowingly leveraging 
one's police officer status for personal and private financial gain; often a conflict of 
interest 
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17. Abuse of Position/Authority (V17) – Using one's status as a police officer to gain 
benefit or privilege for personal gain whether on or off duty 
18. Criminal Conviction (V18) – An officer being convicted for a criminal offence 
19. Unprofessional Language (V19) – Using insulting, profane, or vulgar language in 
the course of a police officer's duties inappropriate for the circumstances 
 
Analysis of Data 
There was a total of 274 incidents where a misconduct was substantiated against an 
officer from January 1st, 2011 to December 31st, 2017 (OPCC, 2011-2017). This was calculated 
by totaling the events, rather than by each misconduct allegation in a single event in order to 
prevent inflated calculations as some officers had one or more misconducts substantiated against 
them as a result of a single event.4 Each event was reviewed and screened by the author of this 
major paper and assigned either a 1 for present or a 0 for not present for each of the 19 variables 
listed above. Each event could have more than one variable depending upon the circumstances. 
All the data was entered into a Microsoft Excel database for analysis.  
Once all the data was entered into the database, the frequency of each variable was 
calculated. This provided a clear metric of how often a certain behaviour/action was 
demonstrated by an officer that resulted in a substantiated complaint. The most common 
allegation substantiated from 2011 to 2017 was abuse of authority, which refers to the arrest or 
detention of an individual without good or sufficient cause or unnecessary use of force (OPCC, 
2018). Misconducts, such as abuse of intoxicants or improper disclosure of information, were 
rare (OPCC, 2018). Variables that yielded a larger number were examined to see if they were 
related to other variables that had larger figures.  
                                                        
4 From January 1st, 2011 to December 31st, 2017 there were a total of 534 substantiated misconduct 
allegations (OPCC, 2018). Some of the 247 events had either more than one officer and/or multiple misconduct 
allegations. As this major paper was focused on behaviour, the event was isolated to prevent internal validity 
errors. 
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Results 
The 274 incidents accounted for 436 misconducts. The most common forms of 
behaviours that resulted in a substantiated claims against an officer were a misconduct resulting 
from an honest mistake due to lack of training resulting in breaches of the law and/or 
departmental policy (47 per cent) followed by non-criminal vice and/or statutory offences (16 
per cent) and failure or lack of appropriate investigation and/or reporting (16 per cent). Drug use, 
secondary employment, and lack of appropriate supervision were very rare (see Table 1). 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Distribution of Variables 
 
 Number Percentage 
Alcohol  29 11% 
Prescription Drug  0 0% 
Non-prescription Drug  2 1% 
Secondary Employment  5 2% 
Deceit  18 7% 
Training  129 47% 
Lack of Appropriate Supervision  5 2% 
Inappropriate Use of Force  35 13% 
Division 6 - Internal Discipline  32 12% 
Misuse of Police Databases  24 9% 
Inappropriate Sharing of Information  16 6% 
Non-Criminal Vice and/or Statutory Offences  45 16% 
Failure/Lack of Appropriate Investigation and/or Reporting  44 16% 
Use of Police Position for Personal Financial Gain  2 10% 
Abuse of Position/Authority  17 6% 
Criminal Conviction  14 5% 
Unprofessional Language 18 7% 
 
(OPCC, 2011-2017) 
 
In terms of when the misconduct occurred, three-quarters (n = 206) of all substantiated 
complaints were for behaviours that the officer engaged in while on-duty. The remaining cases 
(n = 69) occurred while the officer was off duty See Table 2). The most common types of 
misconduct among the on-duty cases related to training and the proper application of law and 
 39 
policy. In total, 55% (n = 113) of all on-duty complaints were the results of officers either not 
knowing or incorrectly applying proper law and policy, specifically in the areas of arrest, search, 
seizure, statements, and note taking (OPCC, 2011-2017). For off-duty conduct, 23% (n = 16) 
were training related (see Table 2). Given this, for the entire sample, 47% of misconducted were 
related to inadequate and outdated legal training. Improper information access was only related 
to 9% (n = 24), while improper disclosure of information comprised only 6% (n = 16) of all 
misconduct events. In total, 35% (n = 24) of the off-duty misconducts were alcohol related and 
ranged from impaired driving to abusing one’s authority as a police officer to gain privilege 
while impaired. Alcohol consumption was only associated with 2% (n = 5) of the misconduct of 
on-duty police officers.  
Table 2 – On and Off Duty Behaviour 
 
 On Duty  
(N = 206) 
% Off Duty  
(N = 69) 
% 
Alcohol 5 2% 24 35% 
Prescription Drug 0 0% 0 0% 
Non-prescription Drug 2 1% 2 1% 
Secondary Employment 0 0% 5 7% 
Deceit 15 7% 4 4% 
Training 113 55% 16 23% 
Lack of Appropriate Supervision 5 2% 0 0% 
Inappropriate Use of Force 31 15% 4 6% 
Division 6 - Internal Discipline 28 14% 4 6% 
Misuse of Police Databases5 18 9% 6 9% 
Inappropriate Sharing of Information 13 6% 3 4% 
Non-Criminal Vice and/or Statutory Offence 21 10% 24 35% 
Failure/Lack of Appropriate Investigation and/or Reporting 39 19% 5 7% 
Use of Police Position for Personal Financial Gain 2 1% 0 0% 
Abuse of Position/Authority 8 4% 9 13% 
Criminal Conviction 3 1% 11 16% 
Unprofessional Language 12 6% 6 9% 
 
(OPCC, 2011-2017) 
 
                                                        
5 One event encompassed both on and off-duty misconduct, which was counted as a value of 1 for both 
on and off-duty categories. 
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In total, 38% (n = 26) of off-duty complaints involved some type of officer misconduct in 
which the officer breached a provincial or federal statute (not including the Criminal Code of 
Canada) or committed a socially unacceptable action, such as soliciting a sex trade worker in a 
private place. On-duty breaches were much less common, only comprising 9% (n = 19) of 
substantiated misconduct cases.  There was a total of 14 criminal convictions (5 per cent) among 
the 274 substantiated misconduct cases. Of these 14 instances, 71% (n = 10) were committed by 
officers while off-duty and 26% (n = 5) were committed by officers while on-duty. It is clear 
from the data that there were some discernable patterns. The data suggests that legal training, 
off-duty alcohol use, and inappropriate non-criminal off-duty conduct are areas where police 
officers could receive more education and training to both prevent and reduce occurrences of 
misconduct 
Of the 274 incidents, only 7% (n = 18) involved written or verbal deception. This finding 
suggests that officers were cooperative and truthful during all, but 7% of PSS investigations. 
These were incidents where police officers lied either on reports or to PSS investigators about 
their actions that yielded the initial complaint. In total, only 4 of the events where officers were 
deceptive occurred when the officer was off-duty, while the remaining 15 instances stemmed 
from actions conducted by the officer while on-duty, again noting that one of these incidents 
spanned both on and off-duty conduct. Of those who were deceitful, the punishments listed in the 
OPCC summaries were severe, usually ranging from lengthy suspensions to dismissal (OPCC, 
2018). Table 3 provides an overview of the 18 substantiated deceit misconducts. It is interesting 
to note that 16 of the 18 substantiated deceit misconducts were brought forward by the police 
agency and, after being shared with the OPCC, were investigated by the police agency. This may 
speak to the acceptance of civilian oversight by municipal police agencies and their willingness 
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to bring forward deceit allegations for investigation. The two examples that were directed to be 
investigated by the OPCC were the result of citizen complaints where the police agency was 
unaware of the issue prior to the complaint. 
Table 3 – Discipline for Deceit 
 
Summary Disposition Division 
Agency 
Requesting 
Investigation 
False plainclothes claims Written reprimand 6 Police 
Lied about sick family member and took sick leave Verbal Warning 6 Police 
Poor Investigation and attempted to alter report 
7 Day Suspension Without 
Pay 
3 Police 
Failure to report motor vehicle incident in timely 
manner 
2 Written Reprimands 3 Police 
Officer took personal vehicle through city car wash 
and lied to attendant that it was a police vehicle 
Written Reprimand  6 Police 
Officer made false entry on jail log 
5 Day Suspension Without 
Pay 
3 OPCC 
False allegation against another police officer Dismissal 6 Police 
Lied on a statement to PSS Dismissal 3 Police 
Lied on a statement to PSS Dismissal 3 Police 
Officer submitted false sick leave claim 
2 Day Suspension Without 
Pay 
6 Police 
Officer lied during PSS interview 
25 Suspension Without Pay 
X2 (50 Days Total) 
3 OPCC 
Officer lied on statement to supervisor 
10 Day Suspension Without 
Pay 
3 Police 
Officer made false notebook entry, 2 false entries 
on a police report, a false statement to PSS and lied 
during a PSS interview 
14 Day Suspension Without 
Pay X5 (70 Days Total and 
Demotion 
3 Police 
Officer stole money from team canteen fund Dismissal 3 Police 
Officer lied to PSS investigator Dismissal 6 Police 
Officer lied to PSS investigator 
30 Day Suspension Without 
Pay, Training, Close 
Supervision for 1 Year 
  
Officer lied and was criminally convicted for health 
insurance fraud 
Dismissal 3 Police 
Officer working for secondary employer while 
claiming sick leave from department 
15 Day Suspension Without 
Pay 
3 Police 
 
(OPCC, 2011-2017) 
 
Specific to deceit, 16 out of 18 cases were identified and investigated at the request of the 
police agency whether through the Division 3 or Division 6 stream. Six of the 18 resulted in 
dismissal, while seven of the 18 resulted in lengthy suspensions without pay. As the specific 
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conditions for each case differed, and the DA must consider aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances as prescribed by the Police Act, not all officers who were deceitful were 
terminated, but most received a serious sanction.  
The range of discipline for RCMP officers in BC from 2005 to 2009 revealed a variety of 
discipline measures imposed. Although the RCMP are governed under a different code of 
conduct Act, the information is useful to help gauge the levels of discipline meted-out in this 
province. One should also note that the RCMP are a non-union agency, while municipal police 
officers are unionized. The information presented in Table 4 was taken from a report by Plecas, 
Armstrong, and Cohen (2011). 
 
Table 4 – RCMP Discipline 2005-2009 
 
Type of Disposition # of Members Awarded 
Disposition 
% of Members 
Awarded Disposition 
Reprimand 108 30 
Counseling 102 29 
Forfeiture of 1 Day Pay 41 12 
Reprimand & Special Training 20 6 
Reprimand & Transfer 9 3 
Special Training & Counseling 11 3 
Direction to Resign (Formal Penalty) 3 2 
Reprimand x 2 ** 7 2 
Reprimand & Professional Counseling 7 2 
Reprimand, Special Training, and Professional Counseling 5 1 
Reprimand & Counseling 5 1 
Professional Counseling 2 .9 
Professional Counseling x 3 2 .9 
Reprimand x 3 2 .6 
Reprimand & Forfeiture of Time Off 2 .6 
Counseling x 2 2 .6 
Special Training x 2 2 .6 
Reprimand, Special Training, and Counseling 2 .6 
Reprimand, Special Training, and Close Supervision 2 .6 
Reprimand, Special Training, and Transfer 2 .6 
Reprimand, Professional Counseling, and Transfer 2 .6 
Reprimand x 2 & Counseling 1 .3 
Reprimand x 2 & Close Supervision 1 .3 
Reprimand x 2 & Professional Counseling 1 .3 
Reprimand, Counseling, and Close Supervision 1 .3 
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Professional Counseling & Close Supervision 1 .3 
Professional Counseling & Special Training 1 .3 
Professional Counseling, Counseling, and Transfer 1 .3 
Counseling and Forfeiture of Time Off 1 .3 
Reprimand & Close Supervision 1 .3 
Close Supervision 1 .3 
Close Supervision and Counseling 1 .3 
Reprimand x 3 & Close Supervision 1 .3 
Reprimand x 3 & Professional Counseling 1 .3 
Reprimand, Close Supervision, and Transfer x 2 1 .3 
Reprimand x 4 1 .3 
Recommend Dismissal (Formal Penalty) 1 .3 
Demotion (Formal Penalty) 0 0 
Overall 352 100% 
 
Discipline for the RCMP lay predominantly within the reprimand, counselling, forfeiture 
of one day pay, and reprimand with special training, while dismissal was less than 1% of the 352 
recorded outcomes.   
 
Police Discipline Compared to Public Service Discipline 
 La Van (2007) conducted a study using a random sample of 802 public sector discipline 
cases in the US covering the years from 1998 to 2003. The analysis contained 200 cases drawn 
from the index based on how cases were categorized by the publisher. La Van found that, 
although there are measurable differences between private sector labour arbitration decisions and 
public sector arbitration decisions, there were no differences between the police and other public 
sector decisions (La Van, 2007). La Van did note that there was a conflicting philosophy and 
practice between the internal discipline mechanisms, often based on paramilitary structures and 
processes, used by police employers towards police employees who committed code of conduct 
offences and general labour law practices, often in a collective bargaining/union environment 
that is generally more tolerant and lenient (La Van, 2007). The practice being that, historically, 
police employers would issue severe sanctions against employees for code of conduct offences, 
but those sanctions were later overturned by a labour arbitrator. This resulted in some very public 
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and embarrassing cases for police departments where officers who had lied, stolen, or used 
excessive force were re-instated into their position after having been terminated (La Van, 2007).   
The practice has now transitioned into one where police employers issue less severe 
sanctions that prevents labour arbitrators from reversing them (La Van, 2007). As well, this 
practice has resulted in labour arbitrators supporting employer sanctions in more cases than 
overturning them (La Van, 2007). The public perception is that police officers are treated less 
harshly than other public employees because of their strong unions and special interest group 
support (La Van, 2007). La Van’s (2007) study proved that this is not the case and concluded 
that there are no differences in case characteristics and case outcomes between the police discipline 
cases and other public sector employee discipline cases, including case issue, level of 
government, being represented by a public sector union, and off vs. on-duty behavior. There 
were also no differences in managerial behaviors leading to managerial discipline being 
overturned between the police discipline cases and other public sector employee discipline cases, 
including penalty excessive, lack of evidence of wrong doing, procedural error, lack of due 
process, management process at fault, absence of rule or vague rule, and mitigating 
circumstances. Moreover, La Van (2007) concluded that there were no differences in arbitrator 
behaviors and between the police discipline cases and other public sector employee discipline 
cases, including just cause considered by arbitrator, a consideration of the past record of the 
individual considered, and ignoring contract stipulations. Finally, there were some minor 
differences found for proposed discipline and for the case findings, and although these 
differences tended to be small, there were no differences in procedural outcomes (La Van, 2007).  
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Recommendations 
Based on the information presented in this major paper, there are a number of 
recommendations that police agencies in BC consider to prevent and reduce police deviance and 
misconduct. To begin, continuous mandatory legal and investigation training should be shared 
with police officers by Police Services in the form of bi-annual certification whereby 
developments in statute and case law are discussed. Officers should be provided on-line 
materials by Police Services between these bi-annual training sessions when there are significant 
changes to case law affecting their duties. Officers should complete a knowledge-based exam to 
verify that they understand the law and its application, specific to the areas of powers of arrest, 
search and seizure, use of force, rights of accused, duties under the Police Act, and the 
consequences for improper and/or negligent investigations. This exam could be administered 
through the Canadian Police Knowledge Network (CPKN) system where results may be tracked. 
Those who do not pass the exam would be scheduled for classroom training and, once trained, 
would take the exam again until they received a passing score. Police Services, in partnership 
with municipal police agencies and the OPCC, must create an appropriate program evaluation so 
that the effects of this training may be measured. 
Police Services, in partnership with each municipal police agencies Human Resources 
Section, should develop and train officers about the risks and professional limitations 
surrounding off-duty alcohol consumption. Although alcohol contributed to only 11% (n = 29) of 
the total 274 events, due to its high association for substantiated off-duty misconducts (35% or 
24 out of 69 incidents), it is an area that could be further explored by future researchers to 
develop a meaningful evidence-based program. Any program that is created must contain an 
appropriate program evaluation component so that the effects of this program may be measured. 
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For those officers who experience alcoholism, programs available through Edgewood, 
Alcoholics Anonymous, or other such delivery specialists may be used to assist the officer.  
Police Services, in partnership with BC municipal police agencies, should implement 
mandatory bi-annual training specifically targeted at police ethics and legal training concerning 
criminal behaviour, gambling, statutes, and sex trade work to provide officers with clear 
expectations of police and community standards and the consequences of such violations. This 
would also include a health and wellness support component so officers struggling with personal 
issues would know where to turn for help and support. This would require a strategy and 
program to ensure messaging to officers during their entire career spanning from the recruiting 
stage to retirement. This area would require further exploration by researchers to develop a 
meaningful evidence-based program and must contain a program evaluation component so that 
the effects of this training may be measured. 
Municipal police agencies should continue to develop programs and strategies to engage 
under-represented or marginalized communities that are not sufficiently reflected in police 
staffing levels. Programs such as the VPD Indigenous Cadets is one example of police reaching 
out to marginalized youth providing them with positive police interactions and experiences. The 
intention of the program is to assist youth in becoming well-rounded citizens and, for some, to 
potentially become police officers. The aim of these types of programs would be to develop 
future applicants and ensure they meet the hiring standards of the police agency in an effort to 
increase hiring of the affected community. Designers would be required to ensure that an 
appropriate program evaluation was created to measure the effect of the program(s). 
Police Services should also research, develop, and fund the purchase, maintenance, data-
storage, and all other related costs for body-worn cameras. In addition, Police Services, in 
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partnership with municipal police agencies, would develop training standards, information 
retention protocols, and policy and procedure concerning their use. The cost associated with 
body-worn cameras would be significant, therefore, Police Services should contract university 
researchers to further explore this technology and conduct a cost benefit analysis to determine 
their efficacy. If approved, future researchers would need to develop a program and ensure that 
an appropriate program evaluation was implemented to determine if the application of body 
worn cameras met the intended objectives. 
Municipal police agencies must also continue to review internal policies to ensure they 
comply with law and community standards. Further, police agencies must continue to engage 
with the community in both formal and informal settings, as well as encouraging multi-cultural 
values within their respective police organization. This will help maintain police legitimacy, 
specifically with marginalized communities and prevent a homogenous police culture or “group-
think” from taking hold within an agency.  
A final recommendation is that Police Services, in partnership with municipal police 
agencies and municipal government, should also consider creating a committee comprised of 
provincial, municipal, police, industry, and academic stakeholders at the managerial level, to 
further examine the practical relevance of implementing an insurance model similar to the one 
outlined by Rappaport (2017).The mandate of the committee could be to research the plausibility 
of an insurance model, examine other agencies who use this approach, and evaluate the pros and 
cons of adopting such a model in BC. If the committee determines that this theoretical concept 
has practical applications in BC, a steering-committee should be created with representatives 
from the same areas, but at the front-line supervisory level, to conduct further research into this 
concept and determine if it could be implemented in one BC police agency for a trial period. Any 
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program implementation would require an appropriate program evaluation component to ensure 
the results could be properly measured. 
Conclusion 
 
Policing in North America and the United Kingdom continues to evolve. Police deviance 
and misconduct may be found throughout all police agencies to varying degrees ranging from 
minor code of conduct infractions to criminal actions on the part of police officers and agencies. 
For those who do commit a code of conduct misconduct, it appears from the literature review 
that they are held accountable, educated when applicable, and removed when appropriate 
(OPCC, 2011-2017).  
Criminological theories, such as Knowledge Management as well as a modified version 
of Merton’s Strain Theory help explain how to categorize and identify behavioural traits in both 
officers and the community that may assist officers and police agencies when determining what 
is acceptable within the community as a police agency. Introducing methods to mitigate, reduce, 
and remove police deviance lends itself to generalized solution-based strategies, such as civilian 
oversight, diverse recruiting, technology, police-community engagement, and liability insurance. 
Although some of these strategies are more experimental and US specific, such as liability 
insurance, they can serve to assist police agencies and community leaders to expand the 
spectrum of potential resolutions available to them. The strength of the solutions found within 
the academic literature is that these solutions allow each agency and community to implement 
the general concept with specific tailoring to their respective environment. 
The results yielded from the OPCC data offer a unique insight into common behaviours 
that contribute to officer misconduct. Providing officers with additional and continual legal 
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education and training will not only help officers provide a better policing service, but also 
reinforce to the community that their officers are upholding and implementing police strategies 
within the boundaries of the law. Increasing legal education may assist in reducing substantiated 
police misconduct complaints; however, further studies would be required to substantiate this 
hypothesis. Other forms of common behaviours contributing to on and off-duty conduct, such as 
alcohol use and breaching non-criminal statutes, could be further studied by researchers using 
qualitative and quantitative research methods, such as interviewing officers, investigators, and 
OPCC analysts involved with the complaint to develop more detailed insight into common 
causes that led to officer misconduct behaviours and analysing in greater detail databases on 
police misconduct. 
Contrary to much of the academic literature from the United States, the analysis in this 
major paper suggests that BC municipal police officers demonstrate a high level of honesty 
during an investigation into misconduct. This is paramount as it helps to demonstrate the 
institutional culture of BC municipal police agencies in that they and their respective officers are 
honest and truthful with initial occurrence reporting and during the PSS investigation for the 
alleged misconduct. This should be very reassuring to BC police agencies, the OPCC, and the 
community and bolster the foundation of trust among all three.  
After analysing the summaries of substantiated police misconduct events for patterns of 
similar officer behaviour, there were discernable patterns and trends. This information is 
sufficient to assist police, civilian oversight agencies, and future researchers understand where to 
focus preventative and response measures. Moreover, a review of the academic literature on 
police deviance yielded several broad practical solutions that could be implemented by police 
and civilian oversight agencies. These agencies could then tailor their broader strategies to align 
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with the specific needs of the relevant police agency and community. By engaging the general 
academic strategies and conducting further research into the causes of the above noted BC 
municipal police officer behaviours, BC police agencies will continue to provide exemplary 
public safety service while retaining and strengthening the trust between the community and 
civilian oversight agencies. 
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Appendix A – Police Act Misconducts 
 
Division 2 — Misconduct 
 
Defining misconduct 
 
77 (1) In this Part, "misconduct" means 
 
(a) conduct that constitutes a public trust offence described in subsection 
(2), or 
(b) conduct that constitutes 
(i) an offence under section 86 [offence to harass, coerce or intimidate 
anyone questioning or reporting police conduct or making complaint] or 
106 [offence to hinder, delay, obstruct or interfere with investigating 
officer], or 
(ii) a disciplinary breach of public trust described in subsection (3) of 
this section. 
 
(2) A public trust offence is an offence under an enactment of Canada, or of any 
province or territory in Canada, a conviction in respect of which does or would likely 
(a) render a member unfit to perform her or his duties as a member, or 
(b) discredit the reputation of the municipal police department with which the 
member is employed. 
 
(3) Subject to subsection (4), any of the conduct described in the following paragraphs 
constitutes a disciplinary breach of public trust, when committed by a member: 
 
(a) "abuse of authority", which is oppressive conduct towards a member of 
the public, including, without limitation, 
(i) intentionally or recklessly making an arrest without good and 
sufficient cause, 
(ii) in the performance, or purported performance, of duties, 
intentionally or recklessly 
(A) using unnecessary force on any person, or 
(B) detaining or searching any person without good and sufficient 
cause, or 
(iii) when on duty, or off duty but in uniform, using profane, abusive or 
insulting language to any person including, without limitation, language 
that tends to demean or show disrespect to the person on the basis of 
that person's race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, 
religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, 
sexual orientation, age or economic and social status; 
 
(b) "accessory to misconduct", which is knowingly being an accessory to any 
conduct set out in this subsection, including, without limitation, aiding, 
abetting, counselling or being an accessory after the fact; 
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(c) "corrupt practice", which is 
(i) without lawful excuse, failing to make a prompt and true return of, 
or misappropriating, any money or property received in the 
performance of duties as a member, 
(ii) agreeing or allowing to be under a pecuniary or other obligation to 
any person in a manner that would likely be seen to affect the member's ability to 
properly perform the duties of a member, 
(iii) using or attempting to use one's position as a member for personal 
gain or other purposes unrelated to the proper performance of duties 
as a member, or 
(iv) using or attempting to use any equipment or facilities of a 
municipal police department, or any other police force or law 
enforcement agency, for purposes unrelated to the performance of 
duties as a member; 
 
(d) "damage to police property", which is 
(i) intentionally or recklessly misusing, losing or damaging 
(A) any police property, or 
(B) any property that is in police custody or the care of which has 
been entrusted to the member in the performance of duties as a 
member, or 
(ii) without lawful excuse, failing to report any loss or destruction of, or 
any damage to, any property referred to in subparagraph (i), however 
caused; 
 
(e) "damage to property of others", which is 
(i) when on duty, or off duty but in uniform, intentionally or recklessly 
damaging any property belonging to a member of the public, or 
(ii) without lawful excuse, failing to report any such damage, however 
caused; 
 
(f) "deceit", which is any of the following: 
(i) in the capacity of a member, making or procuring the making of 
(A) any oral or written statement, or 
(B) any entry in an official document or record, 
that, to the member's knowledge, is false or misleading; 
(ii) doing any of the following with an intent to deceive any person: 
(A) destroying, mutilating or concealing all or any part of an 
official record; 
(B) altering or erasing, or adding to, any entry in an official 
record; 
(iii) attempting to do any of the things described in subparagraph (i) or 
(ii); 
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(g) "discourtesy", which is failing to behave with courtesy due in the 
circumstances towards a member of the public in the performance of duties 
as a member; 
 
(h) "discreditable conduct", which is, when on or off duty, conducting oneself 
in a manner that the member knows, or ought to know, would be likely to 
bring discredit on the municipal police department, including, without 
limitation, doing any of the following: 
 (i) acting in a disorderly manner that is prejudicial to the maintenance 
of discipline in the municipal police department; 
(ii) contravening a provision of this Act or a regulation, rule or guideline 
made under this Act; 
(iii) without lawful excuse, failing to report to a peace officer whose 
duty it is to receive the report, or to a Crown counsel, any information 
or evidence, either for or against any prisoner or defendant, that is 
material to an alleged offence under an enactment of British Columbia 
or Canada; 
 
(i) "improper disclosure of information", which is intentionally or recklessly 
(i) disclosing, or attempting to disclose, information that is acquired by 
the member in the performance of duties as a member, or 
(ii) removing or copying, or attempting to remove or copy, a record of 
a municipal police department or any other police force or law 
enforcement agency; 
 
(j) "improper off-duty conduct", which is, when off duty, asserting or 
purporting to assert authority as a member, an officer or a member of the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and conducting oneself in a manner that 
would constitute a disciplinary breach of trust if the member were on duty as 
a member; 
 
(k) "improper use or care of firearms", which is failing to use or care for a 
firearm in accordance with standards or requirements established by law; 
 
(l) "misuse of intoxicants", which is 
(i) owing to the effects of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or any 
combination of them, being unfit for duty when on duty or reporting for 
duty, or 
(ii) without proper authority, making use of or accepting from any other 
person intoxicating liquor when on duty or when off duty but in uniform 
in a public place; 
 
(m) "neglect of duty", which is neglecting, without good or sufficient cause, 
to do any of the following: 
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(i) properly account for money or property received in one's capacity as 
a member; 
(ii) promptly and diligently do anything that it is one's duty as a 
member to do; 
(iii) promptly and diligently obey a lawful order of a supervisor. 
 
(4) It is not a disciplinary breach of public trust for a member to engage in conduct 
that is necessary in the proper performance of authorized police work. 
Offence to harass, coerce or intimidate anyone questioning or reporting police 
conduct or making a complaint 
 
86 (1) A person must not harass, coerce or intimidate any other person in relation to any 
complaint or report concerning the conduct of a member or former member under this 
Part. 
(2) A person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence. 
Offence to hinder, delay, obstruct or interfere with investigating officer 
 
106 (1) A person must not knowingly hinder, delay, obstruct or interfere with an 
investigating officer acting under this Part. 
(2) A person must not, in relation to a complaint or an investigation under this Part, 
provide to the police complaint commissioner or an investigating officer information 
that the person knows to be false or misleading. 
(3) A person who contravenes subsection (1) or (2) commits an offence. 
Police Act, RSBC 1996, c 367, ss 1-184. 
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